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Preface 
The aim of this essay is to show that any attempt 
to define theoretical limits to the proper scope of the 
criminal law must fail . In Chapter 1 an attempt is made 
to refute the volfenden Committee's contention that 
society must recognise 'a realm of private morality and 
immorality which is ••• not the law's business .' In so 
far as his arguments also pursue this aim Lord Devlin ' s 
thesis is defended but no attempt is made to defend all 
that he said. Briefly, the argument advanced asserts 
that, if it is accepted that any society has the right 
to take whatever steps it considers necessary to ensure 
its continued survival then no jurisdictional barrier, 
such as that proposed by the Wolfenden Committee can be 
erected, owing to the public nature of all conduct . In 
other words , if by ' private morality and immorality ' is 
meant ' private behaviour in matters of morals' then 
there is no sphere of morality which can be distinguished 
on the ground that it has no public effect . The argument 
that there c an be no theoretical limits placed on the 
proper scope of the law does not commit one to holding 
that all immoral conduct ought to be prohibited by law 
but rather that any immoral conduct may justifiably be 
prohibited . 
Ih Chapter 2 an a ttempt is made fir s tly, to 
evaluate the t h eoretical objections to Lord Devlin' s 
the s i s ra ised b y Professor H. L . A. Hart and secondly, 
iii 
to critically examine Professor Hart's own view of the 
proper scope of the criminal law. With regard to the 
criticisms levelled at Lord Devlin's thesis it is 
concluded that Professor Hart's arguments cannot be 
upheld. As far as his own views are concerned it is 
claimed that they are an illegitimate modification of 
Mill's doctrine as set out in On Liberty and as such 
require a complete and separate justification. Moreover, 
it is found that such a justification is not possible and 
thus it is concluded that Professor Hart fails to provide 
a coherent alternative to Lord Devlin's position. 
The final Cha pter deals with the nature of the 
relation of law to society. It is submitted that the 
widespread discussion which the publication of Lord 
Devlin's original Maccabaean Lecture aroused has become 
confused gecause most contributors have at times lost 
sight of the essential nature of the relation . Briefly, 
that relation may be described by saying that the law 
is an instrument of society to be use d to support the 
values which the members of society hold. Once the nature 
of this relation is understood it becomes clear that no 
attempt to define, in advance, theoretical limits to the 
proper scope of the criminal law can succeed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
The enforcement of morals 
Introduction 
On March 18th 1959 Lor d Devlin (the Honourable 
Sir Patrick Devlin as he then was) delivered the second 
Maccabaean Lecture in Jurisprudence before the British 
1 Academy. His lecture entitled 'The enforcement of morals' 
took, as its starting point, the statement of jurispruden-
tial principle expressed by the Departmental Committee 
on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, widely known as 
the Wolfenden Committee. 2 The Committee's formal 
commitment is usefully paraphrased in Chapter II of their 
Report as follows; 'Our primary duty has been to consider 
the extent to which homosexual behaviour and female 
prostitution should come under the condemnation of the 
criminal law ,3 In outlining the Committee's approach 
to the problem the Report states that, 'There appears to 
be no unquestioned definition of what constitutes or ought 
to constitute a crime. To define it as "an act which is 
punished by the State" does not answer the question: rVhat 
1. Devlin, P. 1959. The enforcement of morals. Proceedings 
of the British Academy vol. xlv. Hereinafter all 
references to Lord Devlin are to his book, The Enforcement 
of Morals (1965) London: Oxford University Press. 
2. Report of the Committee on Homosexual Offences and 
Prostitution. 1957. Cmd.247. Hereinafter cited as 
the Wolfenden Report. The Committee of fifteen persons 
under the chairmanship of Sir John Wolfenden C.B.E. was 
appointed on the 24th August 1954 to consider (a) the 
law and practice relating to homosexual offences and the 
treatment of persons convicted of such offences by the 
courts; and (b) the law and practice relating to offences 
against the criminal law in connection with prostitution 
and solicitation for immoral purposes, and to report 
what changes, if any, are desirable. 
3. The ~olfenden Report. Para.13. 
acts ought to be punished by the State? l e have therefore 
worked with our own formulation of the function of the 
criminal law so far as it concerns the subjects of this 
enquiry. In this field, its function, as we see it, is 
to preserve public order and decency, to protect the 
citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to pro-
vide sufficient safeguards against exploitation and 
corruption of others, particularly those who are specially 
vulnerable because they are young, weak in body or mind, 
inexperienced, or in a state of special physical or 
economic dependence.• 1 Furthermore, 'It is not, in our 
view, the function of the law to intervene in the private 
lives of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular 
pattern of behaviour, further than is necessary to carry 
2 
out the purposes we have outlined. It follows that we do 
not believe it to be a function of the law to attempt to 
cover all the fields of sexual behaviour' • 2 In recommend-
ing that homosexual behaviour between consenting adults in 
private should no longer be a criminal offence the Committee 
offered what it considered to be a 'decisive' reason, 
namely, 1 the importance which society and the law ought 
to give to individual freedom of choice and action in 
matters of private morality. Unless a deliberate attempt 
is to be made by society, acting through the agency of 
the law, to equate the sphere of crime with that of sin, 
1. ibid. Para .13. 
2. ~· Para .14. 
3 
there must remain a realm of private morality and immorality 
which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law ' s business. ' 1 
Lord Devlin's lecture consisted primarily of a 
vigorous attack on the standpoint taken by the Committee 
regarding the proper scope and function of the criminal law. 
Howeve~ it is unlikely that such a debate as has resulted 
would have been generated but for at least two reasons. 
Firstly, as Graham Hughes observes, ' a partial explanation 
of the interest aroused by this lecture is no doubt to be 
2 found in the person of its author'. It is indeed unusual 
for members of the British Judiciary to speak publicly on 
legal matters, particularly on such a fundamental topic as 
the aims and limits of the criminal law. Lord Devlin ' s 
pronouncements were therefore of the greatest importance if 
for no other reason than that they represented the views of 
an eminent British Judge. Secondly, taken as a whole, his 
lecture constitutes a powerful assault on a jurisprudential 
position which has become so widely accepted that it may be 
termed the orthodox approach. The position referred to is 
that known as the utilitarian approach to legislation most 
passionately enunciated by John Stuart Mill in his essay 
On Liberty. 3 Nhile the members of the Wolfenden Committee 
may well have believed that there existed ' no unquestioned 
definition of what constitutes or ought to constitute a 
1 • 
2. 
ibid. Para.61. The Report is signed by all thirteen 
members who served on the Committee throughout the enquiry 
but there were five separate reservations by members or 
groups of members. One member , Mr. James Adair dis-
associated himself from the recommendation referred to. 
Hughes, Graham. 1962. Morals and the criminal law. 
Yale Law Journal 71:662. 
Mill , J.S. 1859. On Liberty . 
(1962) Edited by M.Warnock. 
in 
London. Reprinted Utilitarianism 
London: Collins. A 
crime' and have found it necessary to set up their ' own 
formulation of the function of the criminal law', the 
similarity between their formulation and that put 
forward by Mill a century before seems too great to be 
mere coincidence. In introducing his now famous essay 
Mill had said that, 'The object of this Essay is to 
assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern 
absolutely the dealings of society with the individual 
in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means 
used be physical force in the form of legal penalties, 
or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle 
is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, 
individually or collectively, in interfering with the 
liberty of action of any of their number, is self-
protection. That the only purpose for which power can 
be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilised 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not 
a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled 
to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do 
so, because it will make him happier, because, in the 
opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or even 
right. • 1 
In examining Lord Devlin ' s Academy address then, 
it is important to realise that he was attacking the 
formal principles on which the Report rests ascpposed 
to the substantive recommendations contained in it. 
1. ibid . P.135. 
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Referring to the Report Lord Devlin observes that 'Its 
authors were not, as I am trying to do , composing a paper 
on the jurisprudence of morality; they were evolving a 
working formula to use for reaching a number of practical 
conclusions. I do not intend to express any opinion one 
way or the other about these; that would be outside the 
scope of a paper on jurisprudence . I am concerned only 
with general principles ••• 11 Briefly then , the 
Maccabaean Lecture constitutes a forceful attack on the 
position of juristic principle adopted by the Wolfenden 
Committee . The aim of the arguments advanced in this part 
of the essay is to demonstrate the impossibility of up-
holding the 'Volfenden Committee ' s contention that society 
must recognise ' • • • a realm of private morality and 
immorality which is, in brief and crude terms , not the 
law ' s business ! once it is admitted that society has the 
right to ensure its continued survival . In so far as his 
arguments also pursue this aim, Lord Devlin ' s position 
will be defended but no attempt is made to de f end all that 
he said . Consequently , detailed discussion of his lecture 
will be limited to that part concerned with refuting the 
attempt made by the Committee to define theoretical limits 
to the proper scope of the criminal law . 
Cr ime and sin 
Lord Devlin sets out the terms of reference for 
his ' general and fundamental ' inquiry in the form of the 
1 . Devlin . op. cit . P . 2 . 
following question : ' What is the connection between crime 
and sin and to what extent, if at all , should the criminal 
law of England concern itself with the enforcement of 
morals and punish sin or immorality as suchl ~1 There is 
already, in this opening statement, an identification of 
immorality with sin which may be d i sturbing to the 
secular reader. However, Lord Devlin is to be partially 
excused, for what at first sight might appear to be a 
serious blunder, on the ground that the dOlfenden Report 
from which Lord Devlin began, also equated sin with 
. l"t 2 immora 1 y . The difficulty which arises with this 
equation is that for the religious person most actions 
which he terms'immora~ constitute sins in as much as they 
represent a failure to act in accordance with the ' divine 
6 
law ' , whereas for the secular person who rejects the notion 
of a divine law altogether, the term ' sin ' , as it is 
employed in common discourse, is devoid of reference . 
However , if, following Lord Devlin, ' sin ' is allowed the 
wider of the two meanings assigned to it in the Oxford 
English Dictionary where it is defined as ' transgression 
against the divine law or principles of morality ' , offence 
is unlikely to be taken . Although Lord Devlin makes 
explic it r e f erence to the English criminal l aw , it will 
be assume d that his remarks were not intended to be 
applicable to that legal system alone . Thr oughout the 
rest of his lecture he does not refer explicitly to 
1 . ibid . P . 2 . 
2 . See para 61 quoted above . 
England save by way of example and for this reason it 
seems that notwithstanding the opening references to 
England his normative theoretical statements were intended 
to be applicable to societies in general. 
Lord Devlin structures his lecture by posing three 
questions which he endeavours to answer. 
1. Has society the right to pass judgement at all on 
matters of morals? Ought there, in other words, to be 
a public morality, or are morals always a matter for 
private judgement? 
2. If society has the right to pass judgement, has it 
also the right to use the weapon of the law to enforce it? 
3. If so, ought it to use that weapon in all cases or 
7 
only in some; and if only in some, on what principles should 
it distinguish? 1 
Has society the right to pass judgement on matters of 
morals? 
In Lord Devlin's opinion the Volfenden Report 
contains the implication that '••• there ought not to be 
a collective judgement about immorality per se. 12 However , 
whilst attempting to answer the first question Lord Devlin 
appears to stray from the issue at hand for he proceeds to 
demonstrate that there does exist, in England for example, 
a public morality which condemns, among other things, 
homosexual behaviour. Lord Devlin argues that the Committee 
1. Devlin op. cit. Pp. 7-8. 
2. ibid. P. 8. 
implicitly recognises the existence o f such a public 
morality , for , ' if society were not prepared to say that 
homosexuality is morally wrong there would be no basis for 
having a law protecting youth from "corruption" ••• as the 
1 Report recommends .' Here Lord Devlin quite clearly seems 
to be in error for there may well exist other reasons which 
makes the fixing of a minimum age limit desirable . In 
England, for example, the drinking of alc ohol is not 
generally regarded as immoral in itself and yet there are 
laws prohibiting minors from drinking on licensed premises . 
Similarly, in the same society, heterosexual activity is 
8 
not r egarded per seas immoral but there are laws prohibiting 
sexual intercourse with any female under the age of sixteen 
years , as well as laws which make it illegal to live on the 
earnings of a female prostitute. To punish acts of a similar 
nature in a homosexual context need not involve a general 
judgement about homosexual acts between consenting adults. 2 
However, the question as to whether a collective 
judgement or a public morality ought to exist will not be 
answered by proving that such a thing does exist and it seems 
odd that Lord Devlin appears to attach so much importance to 
1. ib i d . 
2. In considering at what age a man is to be regarded as an 
' adult ' for the purposes of their recommendation the 
Committee states that , ' It seems to us that there are four 
sets of considerations which should govern the decision on 
this point . The first is connected with the need to pro-
tect young and immature persons; the second is connected 
with the age at which the pattern of a man ' s sexual develop-
ment can be said to be fixed; the third is connected with 
the meaning of the word ' adult ' in the sense of 'responsible 
for his own actions'; and the fourth is connected with the 
consequenceswhich would follow from the fixing of any 
particular age '. The Wolfenden Report . Para.66 . 
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proving that a public morality exists in a society such as 
England . Lord Devlin does , however, present what he terms 
an'a priori' argument designed to ' justify ' the existence 
of ' such a thing as a public morality ' . He argues that, 
1 ,~hat makes a society of any sort is community of ideas , 
not only political ideas but also ideas about the way its 
members should behave and govern their lives . Every society 
has a moral structure as well as a political one . 11 An 
analogy can be drawn , according to Lord Devlin , between 
immorality and treason . ' Society cannot tolerate rebellion ; 
it will not allow argument about the rightness of the 
2 
cause .' Just as treason threatens the very existence of 
society by threatening the existence of its political 
structure, so immoral behaviour threatens society by 
threatening its moral structure. It is here that Lord 
Devlin introduces what appears to have become the single 
most controversial issue of his lecture, namely the degree 
to which any immoral conduct is capable of threatening the 
shared morality . He asserts that , ' If men and women try to 
create a society in which there is no fundamental agreement 
about good and evil they will fail; if , having based it on 
common agreement, the agreement goes, the society will 
disintegrate. For society is not something that is kept 
together physically , it is held by the invisible bonds of 
common thought . 1 3 
1 . Devlin. op. cit. P.9. 
2 . ibid. 
3. ibid. P . 10 . 
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Lord Devlin ' s affirmative answer to the first 
question rests then on two premises. The first asserts 
that society has a right to take any steps necessary for 
its preservation. Lord Devlin does not make clear exactly 
what sort of ' right ' it is to which he refers , nor does he 
attempt to establish the r ight at all . It would seem, 
however, that for the purposes of Lord Devlin ' s address it 
should be regarded as a principle of critical morality -
' ••• a principle, rationally acceptable, to be used in the 
1 
evaluation or criticism of social institutions generally . ' 
Professor Hart commenting on Lord Devlin ' s use of this 
principle concedes that 'it is surely clear that anyone who 
holds the question whether a society has the "right" to 
enforce morality , or whether it is morally permissible for 
any society to enforce its morality by law , to be discuss-
able at all, must be prepared to deploy some such general 
principles of critical morality . 12 For the purposes of the 
present essay this principle of critical morality will 
be assumed as given and no detailed attempt will be made 
to support its adoption . The justification for proceeding 
in this manner is that Professor Hart ' s subsequent attack 
on Lord Devlin ' s thesis , which is the subject of the following 
chapter , consists of an attempt to show that this principle , 
even if accepted, is inadequate for the latter ' s purpose . 3 
1 . Hart, H. L . A. 1 963 . Law, Liberty and Morality . London: 
Oxford University Press . P . 19 . 
2. i.lu...!i· Pp.19-20 . 
3 . Professor Hart makes this explicit at the conclusion of 
Law , Liberty and Morality where he states that ' ••• the 
proposition that it is justifiable to enforce morality 
is, like its negation, a thesis of critical morality 
If, however, it can be shown that once this 'right' is 
admitted it becomes impossible to define ex ante 
theoretical limits to the proper scope of the law, then 
any attempt to impose such limits (such as the attempt 
made by the ~olfenden Committee), will require a denial 
of the existence of such a 'right'. The limited aim 
of the arguments advanced in this chapter is, then, to 
show that it follows upon the acceptance of this 
principle of critical morality that any attempt to 
define such limits must fail. 1 
11 
The second premise on which Lord Devlin's argument 
rests, namely that ' What makes a society of any sort is 
community of ideas, not only political ideas but also 
ideas about the way its members should behave and govern 
their lives', whilst appearing at first sight quite 
requiring for its support some general critical 
principle. It cannot be established or refuted simply 
by pointing to the actual practices or morality of a 
particular society or societies. Lord Devlin, whose 
thesis I termed the moderate thesis, seems to accept 
this position, but I have argued that the general 
principle which he deploys, namely that a society has 
the right to take any step necessary for its preser-
vation, is inadequate for his purpose.' (P.82). 
1. It is realised that dependent on the consequences of 
accepting this general principle some people may 
doubt the principle itself. For example, Professor 
Hart points out that, 'If a society were mainly devoted 
to the cruel persecution of a racial or religious 
minority, or if the steps to be taken included hideous 
tortures, it is arguable that what Lord Devlin terms 
the "disintegration" of such a society would be morally 
better than its continued existence, and steps ought not 
to be taken to preserve it.' Law Liberty and Morality 
(P.19). However , discussion of how such general principles 
may be supported or refuted is beyond the scope of the 
present essay and is not required to satisfy its 
limited aim. 
12 
straightforward, is , in fact, fraught with ambiguities. 
Firstly, it is not at all clear what type of statement 
it is supposed to be. Is it a quasi-definition of 
' society • ? 1 If so, then all i mLorality is eo ipso 
disruptive of society and , if the first premise is true, 
ought to be suppressed . Or is it that immorality is 
thought to be c usally connected with social disintegra-
tion? In that case it is a statement of sociological 
fact and n Peds to be supported by argument. Reading 
the lecture as a whole it would seem that Lord Devlin 
generally adopts the second - surely the more plausible 
- position, and it is this position which will be 
discussed in the present chapter. However, the vague 
generalisations that Lord Devlin puts forward cannot be 
said to constitute 'evidence'. He suggests that 'an 
established morality is as necessary as good government 
to the welfare of society . Societies disintegrate from 
within more frequently than they are broken up by 
external pressures. There is disintegration when no 
common morality is observed and history shows that the 
loosening of moral bonds is often the first stage of 
1 . At one point in his lecture Lord Devlin does state 
baldly that ' society means a community of ideas; 
without shared ideas on politics, morals and ethics 
no society can exist '. (P.10). If the term ' means ' 
is here used as synonomous with ' can be defined as ' 
then Lord Devlin ' s thesis becomes vacuous . However, 
there is also a sense of ' means ' which is synonomous 
with ' requires as a necessary condition' and it is 
submitted that it is in this sense that Lord Devlin ' s 
statement is made. Lord Devlin ' s use of ' without ' 
immediately following , the ambiguous phrase ' society 
means a community of ideas ' seems to support this 
latter interpretation. 
13 
disintegration , so that society is justified in taking 
the same steps to preserve its moral code as it does to 
preserve its government and other essential institutions : 1 
Secondly , Lord Devlin seems to equate the 
' fundamental agreement ' which , he argues , is necessary 
for the creation and persistence of a society with the 
' shared public morality ', and this may be an illegit i mate 
identification. If by the ' public morality of a society ' 
is meant ' the actual moral principles generally accepted 
by members of the society ', then it would seem that the 
public morality to which Lord Devlin makes repeated 
reference may include values held concerning many issues 
which would not of themselves appear to be necessary 
aspects of the minimum agreement required for the 
continued survival of society. For example, whilst it 
would seem that a society in which there wa s no shared moral 
value condemning the indiscriminate killing of other members 
would be doomed to destruction, it may be argued that a 
shared view concerning the morality of homosexual behaviour 
is not, in itself , part of the minimum required agreement . 
Even the statement that some shared morality constituting 
the ' fundamental agreement ' is necessary , is ambiguous 
on its own . It may mean that there are certain specific 
moral principles (which could be listed) which must be 
commonly held, or alternatively , it may mean that any 
society must have some shared moral principles without it 
1 . Devlin. op . cit . P.13 . 
14 
being possible to enumerate just which principles. From 
Lord Devlin ' s discussion of the institution of marriage 
it seems clear that his thesis requires the latter 
. t. 1 1.nterpreta 1.on. Lord Devlin's view seems to be that 
there are certain institutions which rest on moral principles 
that might be held to be essential for a particular society, 
not in the sense that no society could exist without them, 
but rather in the sense that their removal would result in 
a fundamental change in the life style of the members of 
that society. Thus Lord Devlin argues that a consequence 
of England ' s Christian heritage, for example, and its 
resultant adoption of monogamy as a moral principle is 
that 'the Christian institution of marriage has become 
the basis of family life and so part of the structure of 
our society ••• It has got there because it is Christian, 
but it remains there because it is built into the house 
in which we live and could not be removed without bringing 
it down. ' 2 
1. In a subsequent lecture entitled ' Mill on liberty 
in morals ' Lord Devlin states that, ' It is generally 
accepted that some shared morality ••• is an 
essential element in the constitution of any society. 
~ithout there would be no cohesion. But polygamy 
can be as cohesive as monogamy and I am prepared to 
believe that a society based on free love and a 
community of children could be just as strong ••• as 
one based on the family . Devlin. op . cit . P . 114 . 
2. Ernest Nagel charges Lord Devlin with failing to 
establish that any specific tenet of public morality 
' is actually included in the community of ideas whose 
maintenance he thinks is indispensible for the preser-
vation of a social order '. Nagel E . 1968 . The 
enforcement of morals . The Humanist 28 : 20-27. 
Reprinted in : Kurtz, P . (Ed . ) 1969 . Moral Problems 
in Contemporary Society . Englewood Cliffs N. J . : 
Prentice-Hall . P . 149 . 
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Leaving aside for the moment the problems 
associated with providing criteria for the 'disintegration' 
or 'destruction' of a society, 1 Lord Devlin's argument in 
answer to the first question is, then, that any immoral 
conduct may, under certain circumstances, pose a threat 
to the survival of society. That it may do so follows, 
according to Lord Devlin, from the very nature of the 
public morality, of which he says, 'Most men take their 
morality as a whole ••• To destroy the belief in one 
part of it will probably result in weakening the belief 
in the whole. 12 Unfortunately, nowhere does Lord Devlin 
discuss in detail this observation, but it is submitted 
that his argument may validly rest on the correct under-
standing of the nature of morality and the nature of 
behaviour. In order to demonstrate this it is first 
necessary to make exactly clear just what is involved 
in the Wolfenden Committee's contention that 'there must 
remain a realm of private morality and immorality which 
is ••• not the law's business.'3 It would appear that 
the Committee's standpoint can be explained in the 
following manner. A person's voluntary actions which 
are not morally neutral are most often in accord with his 
moral beliefs - his morality. Some of these moral beliefs 
will concern behaviour which is obviously capable of 
1. This problem will be discussed in Chapter II of the 
present essay. 
2. Devlin, op. cit. P.115. 
3. The i olfenden Report. Para.66. 
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directly affecting others. A person's beliefs regarding 
the sanctity of human life would be an example. Few 
people would argue that a person ' s beliefs concerning the 
sanctity of human life should not be a matter of concern 
to others. However, there remains a considerable sphere 
of human behaviour which may appear, at least at first, 
to be incapable of affecting others. Presumably the 
field of sexual behaviour would be so regarded by many 
people. So long as the sexual activity is between persons 
with the capacity to consent, who do in fact consent, then, 
it may be argued, society has no grounds on which to 
justify interference. To argue thus is to contend that 
society must recognise a realm of private morality which 
1 is outside the proper scope of the law. However, once 
having ascertained what is involved in the Committee's 
contention it must be clear that such a contention cannot 
be upheld - if it is accepted that society has the right 
to take any steps it considers necessary to ensure its 
continued survival - owing to the public nature of all 
behaviour. The refutation of the Committee's argument 
rests on the fact that there cannot be any area of 
private morality which is to be distinguished because 
1. It would appear that this is also Lord Devlin ' s inter-
pretation of the Committee ' s view when he ar6 ues that, 
' Ahat the report seems to mean by private morality might 
perhaps be better described as private behaviour in 
matters of morals. ' (P.9). The Committee's contention 
can then be restated as follows: ' ••• there must 
remain a realm of private behaviour in matters of 
morals which is ••• not the law's business.' 
17 
behav iour in accord with that spher e of morality can 
have no public e f fect . An important distinction must be 
drawn at this point between behaviour which is said to 
take place ' in private ' and what is termed ' private 
behavi our '. hilst behaviour may be commonly said 
to take place in private in the sense of taking place 
' out of sight of the public ' it is submitted that to 
speak of private behaviour in the sense of behaviour which 
is incapable , under any circumstances, of affecting others , 
1 
error . It must be remembered is to make a linguistic 
that it is classes of behaviour which are prohibited or 
allowed bj the law and whilst some classes of behaviour 
may be less likely to affect other people there is not a 
single class which is incapable of affecting others , 
under certain circumstances . Thus it is submitted that , 
if it is accepted that society has a right to ensure its 
continued survival and that a minimum shared morality is 
essential to the survival of any society , then it must be 
the case that society also has the right to pass judgement 
on matters of morals on the ground that any conduct is, 
under certain circumstances , capable of removing the 
minimum shared morality which is essential . 
Has society the r ight to use the weapon of the law t o enfor ce 
i t s judgements? 
It must now be clear why Lord Devlin believed that 
1 . Of this distinction ~ord Devlin seems to be undoubtedly 
aware for whilst denying the possibility of ' private 
behaviour ' (pp . 12-14) he does argue that ' ••• as far as 
possible privacy should be respected .' c~ . 18) . 
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his answer to the first question was so important as to 
' very nearly dictate the answer to the second question . 11 
As he points out , ' ••• if society has the right to make a 
judgement and has it on the basis that recognised morality 
is as necessary to society as , say a recognised government , 
then society may use the law to preserve morality in the 
same way as it uses it to safeeuard anything else that is 
essential to its existence . If therefore , the first 
proposition is securely established with all its impli -
cations , society has a prima facie right to legislate 
against imworality as such . 12 Furthermore, it follows that 
the right to use the weapon of the law must be unconditional 
and without theoretical limits . In other words, it is not 
the case that some further condition must exist before 
society has the right to enforce morality . It is not the 
case , for instance , that the immorality must be of an 
' other-regarding ' nature as Mill maintained , or that it 
must be shown to affect those who are ' specially vulnerable ' 
as the Wolfenden Report maintained . If society has the 
right to ensure its continued survival and as has been 
submitted , there is no sphere of morality that can be 
distinguished as having no publi c effect, then any attempt 
to set ex ante t heoretical limits to the proper scope of 
the law must fail . Thus Lord Devlin draws a distinction 
between conduct which may harm individual members of 
society and conduct which, without harming any specific 
1 . Devlin . op . cit . P . 11 . 
2 . ibid . P . 11. 
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member, may harm society as a whole. Bigamy, for example, 
is a crime in England irrespective of whether an innocent 
partner is deceived, but it is not clear that the prohibiting 
of such conduct could be justified if the sole legitimate 
object of legislation was to protect individuals from harm. 
It may plausibly be argued that the outlawing of bigamy 
reflects a recognition that monogamy is a necessary moral 
principle for the cohesion of English society. Just as 
the proaibiting of ' black market ' activities may be justi-
fied as an attempt to protect the economic structure of a 
society, so the prohibiting of bigamy can be justified as 
an attempt to protect the moral code of a society. Sadism 
with consenting partners, homosexual acts between consenting 
males, and lesbianism are presumably all instances of 
activity which according to the :olfenden Committee, should 
be a matter of private morality but which, as Lord Devlin 
points out, may have a considerable effect if carried out 
by large numbers of people. Therefore, if society ' s right 
to enforce a shared morality is justified on the ground 
that some minimum moral agreement is essential and it is 
impossible to distinguish a realm of morality which can 
have no public effect then there can be no realm of private 
morality which is justifiably regarded as being forever, 
and for all societies ~ith a legal system or set of rules 
proscribing certain conduct), outside the proper scope 
of the law. 1 
1. A difficulty may arise here in deciding whether this 
thesis can be applied to societies without a legal code, 
or body of rules, distinct from the mores or customs 
generally observed . Briefly , it would seem that the 
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It must be noted, however, that this argument does 
not attempt to show that every breach of the public 
morality ought to be prohibited by the law but only that 
any breach may justifiably be prohibited. The right 
to intervene need not be exercised in every instance and 
the decision whether or not to intervene in a particular 
case should be based on practical considerations. The 
argument set out above shows merely that there can be 
no prior theoretical principle which limits the proper 
scope of the law. 
The problem of ascertaining the moral judgements of society 
Once it is accepted that society has a right to 
enforce the common morality the problem arises as to how 
the moral judgements of society are to be ascertained. 
Lord Devlin argues that the law-maker should attempt to 
ascertain the moral judgements of 'the reasonable man' 
of whom he says, 'He is not to be confused with the 
rational man. He is not expected to reason about anything 
and his judgement may be largely a matter of feeling. It 
is the view point of the man in the street - or to use an 
archaism familiar to all lawyers - the man in the Clapham 
omnibus. He might also be cailed the right-minded man. 
For my purposes I should like to call him the man in 
arguments will only be applicable to societies in 
which the rules of conduct are set up with the specific 
intention of compelling members to act in a certain way 
under threat of punishment. The thesis being advanced 
above would serve as a guide to the law-makers in such 
societies but it would not seem to have application in 
a society where there was no recognised law-making 
body. 
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the jury box , for the moral judgement of society must be 
something about which any twelve men or women drawn at 
random might after discussion be expected to be a.nanimous .• 1 
The terms by which Lord Devlin refers to the reasonable 
man whilst appearing entirely natural to a common law 
Judge have met with considerable opposition from many 
academic philosophers . However, much of the criticism 
appears to be due to a failure on the part of the critics 
to understand fully the point which Lord Devlin is attempt-
ing to make by the employment of these legal expressions, 
namely, that the ~rdinary man to whom the legislator must 
turn has certain characteristics which find expression in 
courts of law in phrases such as ' the reasonable man .' 
For example , being a right - minded man, in a legal sense , 
amounts to holding moral views similar to the rest of the 
community in related matters . Thus if a legislator in 
England was attempting to ascertain the community ' s feelings 
toward homosexuality then a man who regarded all hetero-
sexual conduct between consenting adults (which, it is 
submitted, the vast majority of the society regards as 
moral) as evil , except in those cases where it was incest-
uous in nature , would not be regarded as a right-minded 
man as f ar as sexual behaviour was concerned . Similarly , 
by identifying ' the reasonable man ' with 'the man on the 
Clapham omnibus ' Lord Devlin is asserting that in attempting 
to ascertain the moral judgements of society there is no one 
social class to whose members the legislator can turn. Whilst 
1. ibid. P . 15 . 
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at times Lord Devlin does appear to overestimate the 
moral uniformity of most contemporary societies his 
opponents sometimes write as if they thought that the 
ordinary man's convictions should count for nothing in 
moral matters. Basil Mitchell suggests that some of the 
confusion results from a failure by both sides, to 
distinguish two different questions. 1 One concerns the 
considerations which ideally should determine legislation 
and here, argues Mitchell, expert advice backed by ade-
quate social research is definitely needed. The other is 
a question as to how a final decision is to be reached 
when opinions differ and Mitchell observes that in England 
most people would agree that ultimately the answer must 
be given by the ordinary man. Mitchell charges Lord Devlin 
with holding that the 'democratic ' answer to the second 
question will do as an answer to the former, and his 
opponents with tending to ignore the second question in 
favour of the first. However, it is submitted with reference 
to the charge levelled at Lord Devlin's position that 
Mitchell's observation rests on an ambiguity found in Lord 
. Devlin ' s original lecture which the latter subsequently 
succeeds in removing. In his preface to The Enforcement of 
Morals Lord Devlin states that, ' I do not want to alter 
anything that I wrote but I think that at one point the 
emphasis might be reduced. That is the emphasis on the 
part which "feeling" plays in the judgement of the 
reasonable man. I put the word in quotation marks because 
1. Mitchell, B. 1967. Law, Morality, Religion in a 
Secular Society. London: Oxford University Press. P.50. 
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I am not sure that I use it in its correct philosophical 
sense ••• What I want is a word that would clarify the 
distinction between "rational" and "reasonable" . The 
reasonable man is to be expected not to hold an 
irrational belief . The Emperor Justinian , Professor 
Hart says , stated that homosexuality was the cause of 
earthquakes . That may have been a rational belief in the 
Emperor ' s time , but now that we know a good deal more about 
earthquakes and a little more about homosexuality , we can 
safely say that it wouid be irrational so to believe . But 
when the irrational is excluded, there is , as any judge and 
juryman knows , a number of conclusions left for all of 
which some good reasons can be urged . The exclusion of the 
irrational is usually an easy and comparatively unimportant 
process . For the difficult choice between a number of 
rational conclusions the ordinary man has to rely upon a 
"feeling" for the right answer . Reasoning will get him 
1 
nowhere . ' In a later lecture Lord Devlin makes explicit 
his reasons for using the term ' the man in the jury box . ' 
He explains that , ' When I call him the man in the jury 
box, I do not mean to imply that the ordinary citizen is 
invested with some peculiar quality that enables him to 
pronounce ex cathedra on morals . I still think of him 
simply as the ordinary reasonable man , but by placing him 
in the jury box I call attention to three points . First , 
the verdict of a jury must be unanimous; so a moral 
principle , if it is to be given the force of law, should 
1 . Devlin . op . cit . P.vii. 
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be one which twelve men and women drawn at random from 
the community can be expected not only to approve but to 
take so seriously that they rega rd a breach of it as fit 
for punishment. Second, the man in the jury box does not 
give a snap judgement but returns his verdict after 
argument , instruction and deliberation . Third , the jury 
box is a place in which the ordinary man ' s views on 
morals become directly effective. 11 In discussing the 
manner in which the man in the jury box should arrive 
at his decision Lord Devlin argues that, ' On this sort 
of point the value of an investigation by such a body as 
the folfenden Committee and of its conclusions is manifest. 12 
Thus it seems quite clear that Lord Devlin does not intend, 
as some commentators accuse him of doing, that the snap 
decisions of unreflective morality based on mere feelings 
of dislike and indignation are to be made the ground on 
which a practice is to be made criminal. If Lord Devlin 
believes that the moral judgements of society should be 
arrived at in a manner akin to the way a jury man arrives 
at his verdict - through argument, instruction and 
deliberation - then it would seem that Mitchell ' s charge 
is refuted. It is interesting to note at this point the 
view, similar to Lord Devlin ' s expressed by Lord Reid, 
the one dissentient in the widely discussed Shaw case3 
1 . ibid . P.90. It should be noted that in England Jury 
verdicts are no longer required to be unanimous. 
2. ibid. P . 18. 
3 . Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions (1961) 
2.A.E .R.446. 
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Of the reasonable man Lord Reid observes, 'The law 
departs at its peril from the views of the reasonable 
man . He could not give a definition of what he means by 
justice and neither can I. But that does not prevent him 
from saying that particular things are clearly unjust. e 
as lawyers and legislators can go far but we cannot afford 
to go so far that we offend his sense of justice. i/e may 
try to educate our masters, but we shall do incalculable 
harm if we try to override the views of the average 
1 
reasonable man.' 
Other contributors to the discussion have also 
misinterpreted Lord Devlin's reference to 'the man in the 
jury box.' Ernest Nagel observing that on Lord Devlin's 
view actions judged to be criminal because they are held to 
be immoral are actions which threaten the safety of the 
social order inquires as to the justification for assuming 
that 'twelve "right-minded persons" in a jury box - who 
presumably have no specialised training for evaluating the 
effects on others of some form of deviant behaviour, nor 
the opportunity to undertake a careful study of what is 
already known about them - are more qualified to make 
competent judgements on what may be complex moral issues, 
than they are to pass on the significance of a scientific 
idea or on the merits of a surgical technique?• 2 However, 
1. Lord Reid. 1968. ' The law and the reasonable man' 
Proceedings of the British Academy 54:189-205. Express-
ing the same sentiments Lord Devlin says of the man in 
the jury box that 'it will not in the long run work to 
make laws about morality that are not acceptable to him.' 
(P.21.) 
2. Nagel, E. 1968. The enforcement of morals . op. cit. 
Pp.152-153. 
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the central thesis of Devlin ' s lecture is simply that 
owing to the nature of the public morality any breach of 
it may threaten the whole and thereby threaten society 
itself. The ordinary man - the man in the jury box - is 
therefore not asked whether or not he believes that a 
particular instance of deviant behaviour threatens the 
continued existence of the soci e ty but asked rather , 
whether or not he considers such behaviour to be immoral , 
and , if so, how strongly he feels about such behaviour . 1 
It is submitted that to answer these questions one would 
not require any specific training such as one would need 
to be able to competently pass judgement on ' the merits 
of a surgical technique .' 
The practical aspect of legislation 
Lord Devlin ' s answer to the third question posed 
at the beginning of the lecture is of a different nature 
from the first ~o . The two earlier questions were 
theoretical in that they were concerned with the right of 
any society to enforce its own morality. The third 
question to which Lord Devlin addresses himself requires 
a practical answer - having shown that society has the 
1 . Lord De vlin does at one point say that ' before a society 
can put a practice beyond the limits of tolerance there 
must be a deliberate judgement that the practice is in-
jurious to society.' (P . 17) . However , it is submitted 
that this is not the task of the man in the jury box but 
rather the task of ~he law-maker in deciding whether or 
not to prohibit the practice on the basis of the intensity 
of the feelings of the man in the jury box. As the men 
in the jury box, our task is to consider ' whether looking 
at it calmly and dispassionately , we regard it is a vice 
so abominable that its mere presence is an offence .' (P . 17) . 
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right to pass moral judgements on the ground that a 
minimum shared morality is essential for society and that 
society also has the right to use the weapon of the law 
to enforce those moral judgements , Lord Devlin turns to 
consider the circumstances in which he believes that it 
would be prudent for society to exercise these rights 
and also the principles which should be borne in mind 
by the law-maker concerning proposed legislation . 1 As 
such , his answer to this question reflects his own cultural 
bias and will be discussed only briefly . Lord Devlin 
• 
presents four ' elastic' principles. 2 Firstly , there must 
be the maximum individual freedom that is consistent with 
the integrity of society. Secondly, the legislators should 
always remain aware of the fact that the •limits of tolerance 
shift .' Thirdly, privacy should be respected as far as 
possible and fourthly, it should be remembered that the 
law is concerned with the minimum and not with the maximum. 
It would appear that few of the contributors to the subse-
quent discussion have recognised these statements of 
guiding principles for what they are - ethnocentric 
expressions of moral principles which Lord Devlin presum-
ably believes to be extremely valuable in themselves . How-
ever , it is implicit in the central thesis which Lord 
Devlin is advancing throughout the lecture that the moral 
principles held by men in society may , and presumably will, 
1 . Lord Devlin states that ' The arm of the law is an 
instrument to be used by society , and the decision about 
what particular cases it should be used in is essentially 
a practical one . Since it is an instrument , it is wise 
before deciding to use it to have regard to the tools with 
which it can be fitted and to the machinery which operates 
it .' (P.20) 
2 . ibid . Pp . 16- 20 . 
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differ from society to society . The moral principle 
urging the preservation of individual freedom, for 
example, may or may not be considered important by the 
members of different societies. 1 Similarly, it may be 
the case that in many contemporary societies privacy, as 
a value in itself, is generally held to be of little 
significance, whilst to the average Englishman , although 
his home may no longer be regarded by the law as his 
castle, it remains an institution into which any intrusion 
is strongly resisted. 
However, included in Lord Devlin ' s discussion of the 
third question is one feature which has attracted wide 
criticism , namely, the importance which he attaches to 
feelings of ' intolerance, indignation and disgust.' At 
least one critic has gone so far as to suggest that ' it 
would be a negligible exaggeration of Devlin ' s moral 
philosophy to say that for him what is wrong is what 
makes "the man on the Clapham omnibus" sick . 12 In 
arguing for what he terms ' the chief of these elastic 
principles ' namely, that there must be toleration of the 
1. It may be plausibly argued, for example, that in pre-
European New Zealand society the interests of the indi-
vidual members were regarded as considerably less 
important than the interests of the larger family group 
or those of the tribe as a whole . This is not to suggest 
that the tribal ' laws ' generally were designed with the 
explicit aim of restricting the freedo m of the individual 
but rather to . suggest that if the ordinary member of such 
a tribe was asked to list the principles which he thought 
should be considered when decisions had to be made on such 
matters, he would probably have presented an entirely 
different list from that presented by Lord Devlin. 
2. Wollheim , R. 1959 . •Crime, sin and Mr . Justice Devlin '. 
Encounter 13:P.39. See also: Hart , H.L . A. 1959 ' Immoral-
ity and treason' The Listener. Juiy 30. P.163. 
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maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the 
integrity of society , Lord Devlin states that , ' I do not 
think one can ignore disgust if it is deeply felt and 
not manufactured . Its presence is a good indication that 
the bounds of toleration are being reached . Not every-
thing is to be tolerated. No society can do without in-
tolerance , indignation anddi.sgust; they are the forces 
behind the moral law , and indeed it can be argued that if 
they or something like them are not present, the feelings 
of society cannot be weighty enough to deprive the individual 
of freedom of choice .• 1 It may seem at first sight that it 
is difficult to reconcile this view with that earlier 
expressed by Lord Devlin when he argued that the moral 
judgements of society are to be decided in the manner in 
which a juryman reaches his verdict. However, the difficulty 
is removed by Lord Devlin himself later when he admits that , 
'It may be that the language I used put too much emphasis on 
feeling and too little on reason . Even so , I think that the 
intense criticism which has been focused on the words 
"intolerance , indignation and disgust" (which I do not wish 
to modify) was on any view excessive. To assert or to 
imply - both assertion and implication have been frequently 
employed - that the author would like to see the criminal 
law used to stamp out whatever makes the ordinary man sick 
hardly does justice to the argument ••• The phrase is not 
used in that part of the argument which discusses how the 
1 . Devlin. op . cit . P . 17 . 
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common morality should be ascertained but in that part 
of it which enumerates the factors which should restrict 
the use of the criminal law ••• It must be read in 
subjection to the statement that the judgement which the 
community passes on a practice which it dislikes must be 
calm and dispassionate and that mere disapproval is not 
enough to justify interference • •• If there is not that 
intensity of feeling , so my argument runs , the collective 
1 judgement should not be given the force of law. ' Here 
Lord Devlin clearly points out that the phrase ' intolerance, 
indignation and disgust ' is not to be considered as an 
extension of his theoretical argument concerning the 
manner in which the public morality is to be ascertained. 
Rather, the phrase is found in that part of the lecture 
dealing with the practical difficulty of deciding, in any 
particular instance, whether or not it is prudent to invoke 
the law. It is his opinion as a law-maker , that conduct 
which transgresses the public morality does not threaten 
the cohesion of society unless the ordinary man in the 
street views such conduct with ' indignation, intolerance 
and disgust .• 2 
1 . ibid . P . viii-ix. 
2 . In a subsequent interview Lord Devlin states that, ' It 
is not enough that you should say the majority of people 
disapprove of a certain practice; they must feel more 
strongly than that , to my mind . You must get more than 
the majority, and it must be more than disapproval . I 
look upon it as a restraining factor. If, for example, 
you asked the ordinary man : "Do you disapprove of homo-
sexuality?" he might very well say "Yes" • • • But if you 
went on and said: "Yes, but more than that, does the 
idea of it disgust you? Does it make you indignant?", a 
great number of people who would say they disapprove 
would say: "No, we don ' t feel that about it." ' Encounter 
with Lord Devlin '. 1964. The Listener June 18 . P.980 . 
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Richard ~ollheim argues that it is quite unjustified 
to separate , as Lord Devlin does, the second from the third 
enquiry ; ' ••• it is wrong to ask, first, whether society has 
a right to punish immorality , and then, (as though it were a 
quite separate question) whether this right is qualified or 
1 
not .' However, to argue thus is to miss the important 
distinction drawn above between the theoretical question as 
to whether society has the right to legislate against 
i mmorality on the one hand and the practical question as to 
the circumstances under which it is prudent for society to 
exercise that right . It is submitted that in giving his own 
answer to the latter question Lord Devlin in no way intends 
to qualify the right established by the answers to the two 
earlier questions . 
Conclusion 
The aim of this part of the essay has been to 
defend Lord Devlin ' s thesis concerning the impossibility 
of defining a realm of private morality which lies outside 
the proper scope of the criminal law . If the premise that 
a certain minimum sphere of agreement on moral issues is 
ess ential for the continued existence of society is con-
ceded and the general principle that any society has the 
right to take whatever steps are necessary to preserve 
that society is accepted , then prima facie society has the 
right to legislate against immorality as such . The right 
to enforce the public morality which presumably will include 
1 . Jollheim, R. op . cit . P . 39 . 
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values held on issues , concerning which agreement is not 
necessary for survival is sustained on the ground that the 
public nature of all conduct makes it impossible to set 
aside any particular area of conduct as being incapable 
of destroying the minimum required moral agreement . This 
is certainly not to suggest that all the tenets of the 
public morality are of equal importance to the cohesion of 
society but rather that it is not possible to determine 
ex ante the breaching of which tenets will threaten the 
minimum required agreement . For this reason there can 
be no prior theoretical principle which limits the proper 
scope of the criminal law to certain classes of conduct . 
If the society has the right to ensure its continued 
survival and the members of a society believe that this 
right should be exercised then the law-maker does not 
discharge his duty by protecting the individual from harm 
but must protect also the institutions and the community 
of ideas , political and moral , essential to the continued 
survival of that society. 
CHAPTER 2 
An examin tion of ProfeFsor Hart ' s 
view of the relation between 
morality and the criminal law 
Introduction 
The widespread discussion that the publication of 
Lord Devlin ' s Maccabaean Lecture has aroused is largely 
the result of the entry into the arena of Professor 
H. L . A. Hart . In this part of the essay an attempt is 
made , firstly , to evaluate the theoretical objections to 
Lord Devlin ' s thesis raised by Professor Hart and 
secondly , to examine briefly Professor Hart ' s own 
formulation of the proper scope of the criminal law . 
Professor Hart ' s theoretical objections to Lord Devlin ' s 
thesis 
In considering the positive grounds which may be 
held to justify the legal enforcement of morality Professor 
Hart distinguishes a moderate and an extreme thesis . 
According to Professor Hart the moderate thesis asser ts 
that a shared morality constitutes the cement of society; 
' without it there would be aggregates of individuals but 
no society ', and he attributes this thesis to Lord Devlin . 1 
1 . Hart , d . L . A. Law , liberty and Morality . op . cit . P . 48 . 
According to Professor Hart ' ••• the extreme thesis doe s 
not look upon a shared morality as of merely instrumental 
value analogous to ordered government , and it does not 
justify the punishment of immorality as a step taken , 
like the punishment of treason , to preserve society fro 
dissolution or collapse . Instead the enforcement of 
morality is regarded as a thing of value even if immoral 
acts harm no one directly or indirectly by weakening 
the moral cement of society .' (~ . 49.) He attributes 
this thesis to the noted Victorian judge and historian 
of the criminal law , James Fitzj~mes Stephen as expressed 
in the latter ' s Liberty, Equality, Fraterni t y . (1874) . 
London . 
Based on this understanding of Lord Devlin ' s position 
Professor Hart identifies what he sees as an important 
ambiguity in it. Lord Devlin ' s thesis rr.ay be an 
empirical one, namely, that a breakdown in the shared 
morality of a society is causally conne c ted with the 
disint e gration of that society in which case evidence 
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must be produced to support it, or alternatively , argues 
Professor Hart, the argument might be that a society 
and a group sharing a common morality are ' identical ' ; 
hence any change in the morality is ' tantamount to the 
destruction of a society .• 1 On the latter interpretation 
Lord Devlin ' s argument is based on a particular definition 
of ' society ' and as such the conclusion is no more than a 
necessary truth . However , it is submitted-that the charge 
of ambiguity rests on a misreading of Lord Devlin ' s position 
as Lord Devlin himself points out by stating that he does 
not assert ' that any deviation from a society ' s shared 
morality threatens its existence anymore than I assert 
that any subversive activity threatens its existence. I 
assert that they are both activities which are capable in 
their nature of threatening the existence of society .• 2 
Lord Devlin ' s reply would seem to provide almost con-
clusive proof that the interpretation of his position 
offered in the first part of this essay is the correct 
one , namely , that there is no class of conduct which is 
incapable, under certain conditions, of threatening the 
minimum agreement essential to the survival of society . 
1 . ibid . P . 5 1. 
2 . Devlin . op . cit . P . 13n. 
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Professor Hart appears to acknowledge that some 
minimal mor al c onsensus is essential to the survival of 
society for he speaks of ' the acceptable proposition that 
some shared morality is essential to the existence of any 
so c iety ' which he argues ' might e ven be accepted as a 
ne c essary rather than an empirical truth depending on a 
quite plausible definition of society as a body of men 
wh o hold certain moral views in common . 11 Unf ortunat e ly , 
the supposedly plausible definition of society is quite 
misleading as it stands for it is not at all clear whether 
the phrase ' certain moral views ' refers to specific, 
objective views which are universal in the sense that any 
society of human beings must hold them or whether it 
allows that the necessary ' moral views ' may differ from 
society to society . However , elsewhere Professor Hart 
argues that it is both possible and helpful to discriminate 
between those parts of a society ' s moral code which are 
essential and those which are not , and he describes two 
possible ways of so discriminating . 2 It may be held 
' that the common morality Ahich is essential to society, 
and which is to be preserved by legal enforcement , is 
that part of its social morality which contains only those 
rest r aints and prohibitions that are essential to the 
existence of any society of human beings whatever .' 
ccording to Professor Hart these would include ' rules 
restraining the free use of violence and minimal forms 
1 . Hart . op . cit . P . 51 . 
2 . Hart, H. L . A. 1967 . Social solidarity and the enforcement 
of morality .' The University of Chicago Law Review 
35 : 1-12. Pp . 9-10 . 
of rules regarding honesty, promise keeping, fair dealing, 
and property .' Alternatively, it may be argued that ' the 
morality to be enforced, while not coextensive with every 
jot and tittle of an existent moral code, includes not 
only the restraints and prohibitions such as those relating 
to the use of violence or deception which are necessary to 
any society whatever , but also what is essential for a 
particular society . 11 Professor Hart correctly identifies 
the latter view as corresponding to Lord Devlin ' s thesis, 
citing as evidence , Lord Devlin ' s statement that the 
polygamous marriage in a polygamous society may be just as 
much a cohesive force as the monogamous marriage in English 
. t 2 socie y . It is, however , now quite obvious that Professor 
Hart himself regards as essential only such 'universal ' 
values as thorerelating to the use of violence and decep-
tion of which he says: 'It is quite clear that neither 
Devlin nor Durkheim means that only these (universal) 
elements ••• are to be enforced by law , since any utilitarian 
or supporter of the Wolfenden Report would agree to that 13 
Professor Hart offers no reasons at all to explain why 
these values alone should be enforced, even if it is 
conceded that they alone are necessary to the survival of 
society . It would seem that if it is accepted that society 
has the right to take whatever steps it considers necessary 
to its survival then it is up to those who would place 
1 . ibid . It is not clear what Professor Hart means by 'every 
jot and tittle of an existent moral code ' but it would seem 
to correspond with Lord Devlin ' s view that mere disapproval 
of a practice is not sufficient warrant for its prohibition . 
2 . See Devlin. op . cit . P . 114. 
3 . Hart . op . cit . Social solidarity and the enforcement of 
morality . P . 10 . 
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theoretical limits on the proper scope of the criminal law 
to show that certain classes of conduct cannot, under any 
circumstances, threaten the minimum agreement which 
Professor Hart believes is necessary. In other words, 
for whatever class of conduct that Professor Hart may argue 
lies outside the proper scope of the law all Lord Devlin 
need reply is that surely if an overwhelming majority of 
members of society believed strongly that such conduct was 
evil might not the failure of the law-maker to prohibit such 
conduct threaten the survival of society, by threatening 
the minimum required moral agreement. Because Lord Devlin 
may reply in this way regarding any conduct whatsoever it 
may seem that his thesis is rather vacuous. However, to 
take this line is to forget that all Lord Devlin is trying 
to show is that if society has the right to ensure its own 
survival then no theoretical limits can be drawn which would 
place certain classes of conduct forever outside the proper 
scope of the law. Lord Devlin would agree that immorality 
as such ought not be punished unless it threatens society 
and he believes that it is the task of the law-maker to 
decide whether society is threatened byg3.uging the intensity 
of the common belief. 
According to Professor Hart, Lord Devlin ' s belief 
that there cannot be a prior theoretical limit set to the 
proper scope of the criminal law rests on the undiscussed 
assumption, namely, that all morality forms ' a single 
seamless web, so that those who deviate from any part 
are likely, or perhaps bound, to deviate from the whole. 11 
1. Hart. Law , ~ iberty and Morality. Pp. 50-51. 
It is submitted that this observation is misleading in as 
much as the term ' seamless ' , implies characteristics which 
Lord Devlin may consistently deny that morality exhibits. 
In reply to Professor Hart ' s observation Lord Devlin points 
out that ' seamlessness presses the simile rather hard, but 
apart from that, I should say that for most people morality 
is a web of beliefs rather than a number of unconnected 
ones. This may or may not be the most rational way of 
arriving at a moral code. But when considering the degree 
of injury to a public morality, what has to be considered 
is how the morality is in fact made up and not how in the 
opinion of rational philosophers it ought to be made up. 11 
Professor Hart, by describing the web of beliefs as ' seam-
less ' implies that for Lord Devlin all the moral beliefs 
which a person holds are of equal importance to him which 
is a view that Lord Devlin could consistently deny. His 
actual view would appear to be rather that while some 
beliefs that a person holds may be more deeply held and 
regarded as being morally more important than others which 
he holds , it is impossible to determine exactly the effects 
on the code of beliefs as a whole which the breaching of any 
one particular belief will have . For this reason , society 
cannot be denied the right to legally enforce any particular 
moral belief which its members may hold . To argue that on 
his view of morality Lord Devlin is committed to the view 
that 'those who deviate from any part are likely or perhaps 
bound to deviate from the whole ' is to take Lord Devlin ' s 
1. Devlin. op . ci t. P.115. 
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statements out of context altogether . Lord Devlin is 
concerned not with the effects of the breaching of specific 
tenets of the common morality on the people who do so act, 
but rather the effects that such conduct will have on the 
person who sees such acts go unpunished . Thus Lord 
Devlin ' s argument is rather that ' when considering the 
degree of injury to the public morality it is not possible 
ex ante to predict the effect on that morality of the 
breaching of any specific tenet. 
According to Professor Hart the most remarkable 
feature of Lord Devlin ' s position concerns the source of 
the morality which the criminal law may enforce . ' In his 
reaction against a rationalist morality and his stress on 
feeling, he (Lord Devlin) has I think thrown out the baby 
and kept the bath water; and the bath water may turn out 
to be very dirty indeed . 11 It is not at once clear just 
what Professor Hart means by ' a rationalist morality ' but 
Lord Devlin interprets it to be ' the morality embodied in 
the rational judgement of men who have studied moral 
questions and pondered long on what the answers ought to 
Professor Hart ' s emphasis on ' reason ' is understood 
by Lord Jevlin to be based on the view that by accepting 
the sovereignt y of reason each c onscienc e will be directed 
to the same conclusion . While it may plausibly b e argued 
that Professor Hart is not committed to the x iew that the 
exercise of reason will direct all men to the same 
1 . Hart . ' Immorality and treason .' P. 163 . 
2 . Devlin . op. cit . P . 91. 
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conclusions in moral matters it ~ould seem that he is 
committed to holding that through the exercise of reason 
all men will arrive at superior moral views and the 
question now arises as to whether as men of reason all 
men are equal . If all men are regarded as possessing 
equal abilities to reason then there can be no objection 
to morality being a matter :fbr the popular vote . Thus 
argues Lord Devlin ' The objection is sustainable only upon 
the view that the opinion of the trained and educated mind , 
reached as its owner believes by an unimpassioned rational 
process , is as a source of morals superior to the opinion 
1 
of ordinary men ;' It is submitted that Lord Devlin ' s 
position at this point is a formidable one for Professor 
Hart is forced to accept either that the morality which 
should be enforced is the common morality or to maintain 
that there exist ' moral experts ' ; trained men capable of 
discovering a superior ' rationalist ' morality . Although 
Lord Devlin appears at times to admit that there are 
' correct ' moral views2 his argument is that it is not 
necessa ry that the moral view on which the legislation is 
based be the ' correct ' one . ' I have said that a sense of 
right and wrong is necessary for the life of a community . 
It is not necessary that their appreciation of right and 
wrong , tested in the light of one set or another of those 
abstract propositions about which men forever dispute, 
1 . ibid. P . 93 . 
2 . At one point Lord Devlin remarks that ' a great many 
people nowadays do not understand why abortion is wrong .' 
(P . 24) . The use of ' understand ' here is ext remely odd 
for it seems to suggest some revelation granted to the 
author and few others . 
l 
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should be correct ••• What the law-maker has to ascertain 
is not the true belief but the common belief. 11 Elsewhere 
he argues that ' What is important is not the quality of the 
creed but the strength of the belief in it.• 2 It must be 
remembered that these remarks are addressed to the law-
maker whose task, as Lord Devlin points out, 'is to preserve 
the essentials of his society, not to reconstruct them 
according to his own ideas.• 3 If, as Lord Devlin holds, 
the justification for the legal enforcement of morality 
derives from the cohesive character of a public morality 
then surely 'the quality of the creed' is irrelevant. If 
the law's concern with morality is based on its cohesive 
force then what is important 'is not the true belief but 
the common belief.' Furthermore, it is submitted that, 
in fact, the concept of 'correctness' is inapplicable to 
answers to moral questions such as 'Is homosexuality 
wrong?' To such a question there is no 'correct' answer 
as there is to a factual question such as ' What is the 
present population of England? ' To argue thus is not to 
deny the obvious value of social research which, if brought 
to the attention of the reasonable man , may dispel factual 
misconceptions which hitherto contributed to his belief 
but rather to assert that once the appropriate factual 
considerations have been agreed upon (and here the useful-
ness of such inquiries as that conducted by the Wolfenden 
1 • Devlin. op. cit. P. 94 
2. ibid. P .114. 
3. ibid. P .90 . 
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Committee should be readily apparent) further dispute is 
:, 
always possible resulting from differences in attitude . 
Basil Mitchell argues that if Lord Devlin ' s thesis 
is accepted ' we are committed to the view that the positive 
morality of a given society is beyond criticism . Apartheid 
must be accepted in South Africa , genocide in Nazi Germa ny . 11 
However , to argue along these lines is to presuppose firstly , 
that the policies referred to do , in fact, reflect the public 
moralities in the respective societies and secondly , that 
if the views of the ' rational ' man alone were considered in 
each of these societies such policies would never have been 
introduced . The validity of both of these presuppositions 
is open to question. Moreover, even if their validity were 
firmly established Lord Devlin ' s thesis would not commit 
him to regarding the respective public moralities as beyond 
criticism . On Lord Devlin ' s thesis the values constituting 
the public morality of any society may indeed be criticised, 
for example, from a utilitarian standpoint; what cannot be 
criticised is the law for reflecting those values . 2 
A fundamental objection to Lord Devlin ' s thesis, 
according to Professor Hart, is the farmer ' s apparent 
disregard for empirical evidence. 'The question simply is ', 
argues Professor Hart , ' what evidence is there that a failure 
to enforce by law a society ' s accepted sexual morality is 
likely to lead to the destruction of all morality and so 
jeopardise the existence of society?3 Before an attempt is 
1 . Mitchell. op. cit . P.42. 
2. Th i ·s po'in t is eonside red in detai l in Chapter 3· • . 
3 . Hart. ' Use and abuse of the criminal law ' . P . 51 . 
made to meet this objection it must be pointed out that 
Lord Devlin ' s thesis appears to be a general one concern-
ing the effects of any breach of society ' s moral code 
rather than being limited to the effects of sexual 
immorality . It would seem that a satisfactory answer 
to Professor Hart ' s objection may be given using the ' quite 
plausible definition of society as a body of men who hold 
certain moral views in common ' to which he makes reference . 1 
If it is accepted that it is impossible ex ante to predict 
the effects on this minimum necessary moral agreement of 
the breaching of any specific tenet of the public morality 
then any society which believes it to be the duty of the 
law-makers to ensure the continued survival of that society 
must give the law-maker the prima facie right to legislate 
against immorality. 2 
However, before the task of looking for evidence 
can be approached there must be agreement as to what will 
count as criteria for 'disintegration' . Unfortunately neither 
1. Hart. Law, Liberty and Morality. P.51. 
2. In 'Social solidarity and the enforcement of morals', 
op. cit., Professor Hart phrases the question facing 
Lord Devlin in the following way: ' ••• what evidence 
is there that a failure to enforce ••• morality is 
likely to lead to the destruction of all morality and 
so jeopardise the existence of society?' However, 
Professor Hart's use of the term 'likely' is misleading 
for if he concedes that society has a right to take 
any steps it considers necessary to ensure its continued 
survival and yet wishes to set theoretical limits to the 
proper scope of the law then he must show not merely 
that some classes of conduct are not 'likely' to 
threaten the minimum required agreement but rather that 
certain classes of conduct are incapable, under any 
circumstances, of threatening it. 
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Lord Devlin nor Professor Hart attempts to provide a 
definition of 'disintegration ' in a manner applicable to 
. t. 1 the study of socie 1es. Historians generally appear to 
use the term without making the criteria of application 
explicit. For example, J.V.R. Owens discussing the 
changes which the European colonisation of New Zealand 
brought to the native population admits that ' our criteria 
for defining the stages of European contact are arbitrary 
and Jack precision. If this is a legitimate criticism of 
. 'right it could also be applied to most historians who 
have chosen to talk of the 'breakdown', 'disintegration' 
or 'decline' of that seldom defined entity 'Maori Society12 
1. Lord Devlin draws an analogy between a society and a 
house; of the institution _of monogamous marriage in 
English society he says' ••• it remains there because 
it is built into the house in which we live and 
could not be removed without bringing it down.'(P.9). 
2. Owens,J.M.R. 1968. Christianity and the Maories to 
1840. The New Zealand Journal of History , Pp~25-6., 
commenting on Wright,H.M. 1959. New Zealand 1769 -
1840; Early Years of .. estern Contact. Cambridge. 
!"lass. 1959 . 
Rene Maunier, the noted French Historian, discussing 
generally the effects of intersocietal contact between 
'primitive' societies and 'advanced' European soc:ieties 
observes that 'without his wishing, without his always 
being able to prevent it, the settlement of the white 
man in a primitive country has the effect of disintegrat-
ing the tribe, destroying the customary political and 
traditional order, abolishing established power ••• old 
authorities are shaken, old taboos effaced, and nothing 
is provided to replace the ancient rules and laws which 
the European has been obliged to break down by the mere 
fact that he is trying to colonise. ' The Sociologt of 
Colonies. Edited and translated by ~.o. Lorimer.1949). 
Vol.1. Pp.80-81. Although Maunier ' s comments concern 
intersocietal contact his description of the disinte-
gration process ap:ears to be closely related to the 
process referred to by Lord Devlin. 
A.J. Toynbee devoted a complete volume of his 12 volume 
work A Study of H~story to a discussion of 'The 
Disintegrations of Civilisations' setting out numerous 
case studies drawn from ancient and modern history. (See 
ihat then would count as acceptable criteria for 
'disintegration' in the present context? Often Lord 
Devlin seems to imply that any 'fundamental change' in a 
society ' s way of life would constitute 'disintegration ', 
as he understands the term, whereas Professor Hart some-
times writes as if he thought that anything short of the 
annihilation of all members would be better described as 
' a mere change in the same society. 11 However, elsewhere 
Professor Hart concedes that 'it would no doubt be 
sufficient if our evidence were to show that malignant 
change in a common morality led to a general increase in 
such forms of antisocial behaviour as would infringe what 
seem to be the minimum essentials; the prohibitions and 
restraints of violence, disrespect for property and 
dishonesty. 12 On this statement of Professor Hart ' s 
position the basic difference between it and the thesis 
advanced by Lord Devlin concerns the nature of the required 
minimum agreement. Professor Hart explicitly states above 
that the minimum required agreement concerns universal 
issues on which any society must reach agreement in order 
to survive whereas Lord Devlin ' s view is rather that the 
minimum agreement necessary may involve different issues 
in different societies . Stated in this way it is submitted 
that Lord Devlin ' s view is surely the more plausible; from 
the standpoint of the cohesion of a society there would seem 
especially Vol.5). In presenting his ' challenge-response' 
theory Toynbee writes that ' ••• the ultimate criterion 
and the fundamental cause of the breakdowns of civilisa-
tions is an outbreak of internal discord through which 
they forfeit their faculty for self-determination~ (Vol.5.P. 17) 
1. Hart. ' Social solidarity and the enforcement of morals~ P . 3) 
2 . ibid. P . 12. 
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to be no reason for believing that the only issues on which 
agreement is necessary will be universal issues. On the 
contrary it would appear more likely that the cohesion of 
different societies will rest on agreement concerning 
different issues, although this is not to deny that owing 
to the mental and physical structure of human beings 
certain issues may arise more frequently than others . Thus 
for present purposes ' disintegration ' of a particular 
society may be tentatively defined as ' the destruction 
of the minimum required agreement necessary for that 
particular society.' Having thus tentatively determined what 
will count as evidence of ' disintegration' the question as to 
whether any societies have thus disintegrated as a result of 
the widespread breaching of a particular tenet (or several 
tenets) of their positive morality belongs to the fields of 
history, sociology, anthropology, psychology and the other 
'social ' disciplines . However, for the purposes of the 
thesis being advanced in this essay it is sufficient to 
realise that no theoretical limits to the proper scope of 
the law can be validly drawn based on a distinction between 
classes of conduct which are capable of threatening the 
minimum agreement required for any society and classes which 
are not . Evidence which the ' social ' disciplines may provide 
may show that for a particular society certain breaches of 
the positive morality pose a graver threat than others, but 
it cannot show that certain classes of conduct are incapable 
of affecting the minimum agreement on which that society is 
based. Theories which attempt to set out the proper scope 
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and limits of the criminal law for all societies by drawing 
a distinction between those classes of conduct which are the 
proper concern of the law and those which are not must, 
therefore, fail. 
Professor Hart and legal paternalism 
Professor Hart's view of the proper scope of the 
Criminal Law has been enunciated within the framework of 
his attacks on Lord Devlin's thesis and as such has been 
revealed somewhat accidentally. It is important to notice 
immediately that the position adopted by Professor Hart , 
although drawing heavily on the doctrine set out by 
J.S. ill in On Liberty, differs considerably from the 
latter in certain respects. In this part of the essay 
two questions concerning Professor Hart's position will be 
discussed: Firstly, does it constitute a legitimate 
modification of Mill 's views, and secondly, how coherent 
is the new position? 
In Chapter V of On Liberty Mill goes to great 
lengths to protest the evils of paternalism. He cites, 
for instance, the example of restrictions of the sale of 
drugs and criticises such restrictions as interferences 
with the liberty of the would-be purchaser rather than 
with that of the seller. The basis of Mill's attack on 
paternalism is his view that no one knows better than 
the individual what is best for the individual.1 Thus 
1. Mill argues that 'The only freedom which deserves the 
name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so 
long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or 
impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper 
guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and 
spiritual.' On Liberty. op. cit. P.138. Elsewhere he 
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'the only purpose for which power can rightfully be 
e~e.rsised o¥e~~any member of a civilised community against 
1 his will is to prevent harm to others.• In other words, 
'His own good either physical or moral is not a sufficient 
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or fore-
bear because it will be better for him to do so, because 
it will make him happier, because in the opinions of 
others, to do so would be wise or even right. 12 However, 
Professor Hart makes it quite clear that he does not wish 
to defend all that Mill said for he believes that indeed 
'there may be grounds justifying the legal coercion of the 
individual other than the prevention of harm to others.• 3 
For Professor Hart the justification for allowing what he 
terms 'legal paternalism' rests on 'a general decline in the 
belief that individuals know their own interests best. 14 
For this reason Professor Hart thinks that a modification 
of Mill's principles is required if they are to accomodate 
the rule of the criminal law. However, the means by which 
Professor Hart attempts to make thismodification rests, it 
is submitted, on an extremely forced reaa.ing of Mill. 
asserts that '••• neither one per~on, nor any number 
of persons, is warranted in saying to another human 
creature of ripe years, that he shall not do with his 
life for his own benefit what he chooses to do with 
it ••• ; with respect to his own feelings and circum-
stances, the most ordinary man or woman has means 
of knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that can 
be possessed by any one else.• ibid. Pp.206-7. 
1. ibid. P.135. 
2. ibid. 
3. Hart, H.L.A. Law, Liberty and Morality. op. cit. P.33. 
4. ibid. P.32. 
Professor Hart distinguishes between ' because it will be 
better for him to do so , because it will make him happier ' 
and ' because in the opinions of others , to do so would be 
wise or even right .' He argues that there is a clear 
distinction between the first two qualifications which 
form the basis of the doctrine of legal paternalism and 
the latter which constitutes ' legal moralism '. Before 
turning to consider the coherence of such a distinction 
it should be noted that in constructing his 'modification' 
Professor Hart is jettisoning two of the three grounds 
which Mill believed could not justify interference which 
it seems clear were meant to be read cumulatively and not 
alternatively. Lord Devlin argues that ' Professor Hart ' s 
aFg~went might have been clearer if he had left ~1ill out 
of it. If Mill ' was obviously wrong about paternalism why 
should he be right about enforcement of morals. • 1 The 
strength of Lord Devlin ' s criticism lies in the fact that 
Mill's basis for excluding certain grounds as justifying 
interference is the same for all three excluded grounds; 
namely, that no one knows another man ' s interests better 
than that man himself. If, as Professor Hart believes this 
principle is invalid and so not capable of supporting the 
first two instances it seems plausible to inquire as to 
the justification for regarding it as sufficient to support 
the third instance. Thus it is submitted that Professor 
Hart ' s ' modification ' of ,ill ' s position is not a legitimate 
one at all but rather involves the refutation of the very 
1. Devlin. op. cit. P.133. 
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basis of hill ' s doctrine . As such Prof essor Hart' s own 
position constitutes a diffe rent v iew altogether which 
requires a complete and separate justification . 
The cogency of Professor Hart ' s views concerning 
t he proper s c ope of the Criminal Law which would allow legal 
paternalism as a justifiable ground for interference but 
would deny legal moralism obviously dep ends on t h e poss i-
bility of establishing a firm distinction between preventing 
harm which he approves of, and enforcing morality, which he 
condemn s. Professor Hart does not make his position entirely 
clea r but it would seem t hat two possiblities are open to 
him. Firstly , he may limit legal paternalism to the 
prevention of physical harm or he may inc lude as well , the 
prevention of non-physica l or p sychological harm provi ded 
that the latter ca n be def ined in objective terms wh ich do 
• 
not reflect specific moral values. Secondly, he may extend 
legal paternalism to include protection from moral harm 
also , in which case , for his criticism of Lord Devlin ' s 
position to remain.standing , he will have to distinguish 
between moral paternalism and legal moralism . In any event 
the choosing of the second alternative will involv e a conces-
sion that there is no realm of private morality which is ' not 
the l aw ' s business .' 
There would seem to be no reasonable grounds on wh i:h 
t o l i mi t j ustifiable paternalism to a concern f or physi cal 
harm . As Lord Devlin argues , ' if paternalism be the 
princ iple , no father of a family would content himself with 
looking after his children ' s welfare and leaving their 
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morals to themselves .' Indeed , as has been noted above , 
the very ground on which Professor Hart justifies legal 
paternalism is ' ••• a general decline in the belief that 
individuals know their own interests best .' If the decline 
in the belief is justified it would appear to be quite 
implausible to suggest that whilst individuals do not 
know what is best for them physically they do know what 
is best for them in a non-physical or psychological sense. 
Would it then be possible for Professor Hart to allow 
physical and psy chological paternalism but to deny that the 
lat ter amounted to protecting people from moral harm? 
Lady ,Joo..,'i;on observes that ' long indeed is the road to be 
travelled before we can hope to reach a definition of 
mental-cum-physical health, which is objective, scientific , 
and wholly free of social value judgements. 12 Basil 
Mitchell correctly identifies the principa1 difficulty 
as arising from 'the tendency to define mental health in 
terms of social adJust1,11ent , .so· that the aim of therapy 
should be to adjust the individual to the demands of his 
society. 13 It is usual for the psychologist and the 
psychiatrist to describe their task as ensuring that the 
patient will be able to live a ' normal ' life . Surely 
' normal ' is to be considered a relative term; 'normality' 
can only be defined with reference to other members of the 
society. Furthermore, as }itchell points out ' to define 
1. Devlin. op. cit. P .135. 
2. Woqton.Social Science and Social Pathology. P .225. 
3. J\itchell. op. cit . P.57 . 
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mental health in terms of adjustment, not to an existing 
society, but to an ideal society, does no more than substitute 
explicit for implicit value judgements. 11 Professor Hart 's 
second possiblity is to allow that legal paternalism 
should cover physical and moral well-being but to argue 
that moral paternalism and legal moralism the enforcement 
of morals - are distinguishable. According to Lord Devlin 
such a distinction is an impossibility because ' a 
moral law, that is, a public morality, is a necessity for 
paternalism, otherwise it would be impossible to arrive at 
a common judgement about what would be for a man's moral 
good. If then, society compels a man to act for his own 
moral good society is enforcing the moral law; and it is 
a distinction without a difference to say that society is 
acting for a man's own good and not for the enforcement of 
2 the law.' It would certainly seem that if one man tells 
another to do or refrain from doing some act because it is 
morally harmful then that man is attempting to impose his 
own moral views on another. When the former's voice is 
given the force of law moral paternalism and the enforce-
ment of morals are indistinguishable. 
The distinction between legal paternalism and legal 
moralism is defended by Professor Hart on the ground that 
the former constitutes a sounder policy because it is 
based on the principles of 'critical morality' rather than 
on the views of the ordinary man. However, Professor Hart's 
1. ibid. P .59 . 
2. Devlin . op. cit. P .136. 
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argument assumes that a distinction between legal 
paternalism and legal moralism has already been made and 
also that there exists a unique system of critical morality 
which underlies the proposals of legal paternalism and 
provides it with a sound base whereas in fact many systems 
of critical morality have been developed and their 
respective answers as to what is in men 's best interests 
do not always coincide. 
Moreover, regardless of the possibility of 
distinguishing clearly between moral paternalism and legal 
moralism the acceptance of the former doctrine must have the 
consequence of denying the possibility of a realm of 
private morality which lies outside the proper scope of 
the criminal law. Thus it is submitted that Professor 
Hart's positive thesis fails to provide a coherent alternative 
to Lord Devlin's position . 
CHAPTER 3 
The relation of law to so c iety 
Int r oduction 
The main aim of the arguments advanced in the 
first two chapters of this essay has been to refut e the 
s t atement of principle expressed in the Wol f enden Report 
that society must recognise • a realm of private mo r ality 
and immorality which i s , in brief and crude t e rms , not 
the l aw ' s business .' For t he purposes of argument the 
Committee ' s view has been understood as proposing the 
fixing of a jurisdictional barrier whi ch would p l ace 
certain classes of conduct foreve ~ and f or all societies 
with a legal code (as distinct from a system of mores 
or customs~ beyond the proper scope of the law . The 
thesis advanced in the first two chapters asserts that 
i f it is admitted that any society may justifiably take 
whatever steps it considers necessary to ensure its 
continued survival then no such barrier can be erected .1 
However , it seems to have been assumed by b oth Professor 
Hart and to some extent Lord Devl in as well as by the 
member s of t he Wolfenden Committee that the l aw can be 
disc ussed , and the limits to its proper scope in any 
s o cie t y settled , by rational ph i losophical argument , as 
if the law in any society enjoyed an existence independent 
of the society in which it functions . It is against this 
1. It mu s t be noted that the pr e servation of society 
is not being put forwa rd as valuable in itself but 
rath er as a nece s sary i n strument in safeguarding 
the interests of the individua ls who compose the 
society . 
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assumption that the arguments of this chapter are directed. 
The aim of the chapter is to suggest rather, that if the 
operation of the law as an institution in any society is 
justified by the right of any society to take whatever steps 
it considers necessary to ensure its continued survival then 
the proper functions for, and limits to, the law must be 
precisely and only what the members of that society wish 
them to be because only in this way can the law justifiably 
attempt to ensure the continued survi~al of that society. A 
consequence of this view will be that any theory which 
attempts to define theontical limits to the classes of 
conduct which constitute the proper scope of the law will 
be doomed to failure. 
The law as an instrument of society 
It is submitted that the debate between Lord Devlin 
and Professor Hart has become confused because both parties 
have at times appeared to lose sight of the nature of the 
relation of the law to the society in which it operates. 
Briefly, it is submitted that the operation of the law as 
an institution should be discussed in the way that the 
operation of any man-made instrument is; namely, that the 
law can only be evaluated in terms of the extent to which it 
serves the purposes for which it is used . Thus it is 
suggested that the proper functions, and limits to, the 
~ope of the law in any society cannot be discussed without 
reference to the values that the society does in fact hold. 
It is necessary at this stage to distinguish at 
least two different levels of values which the members of 
any society may hold concerning the law. Firstly, there are 
those values which may be termed 'substantive values' which 
concern the classes of conduct which should come under the 
scrutiny of the law. For example, it is quite obvious 
that both Lord Devlin and Professor Hart believe that the 
killing of one man by another should, in most circumstances, 
be prohibited by the law. Secondly, there are the values 
which the members of a society may hold regarding the 
principles in accord with which the law should be made and 
administered. These may be termed 'procedural values.' In 
English society, for example, there is a widely held belief 
that the highest legislative body should be a Parliament 
whose members are voted into office by a majority vote. 
If the arguments advanced in the previous two chapters are 
valid then the way in which the law must function if it is 
to preserve society must be by supporting the values, both 
substantive and procedural, which the members hold. Thus 
there can be no argument agout the merits or demerits of 
a particular law or a particular legal system as such in 
isolation from the values held by the society in which 
it functions. 
It may be argued that thenembers of a society may 
hold a substantive value which because of its content may 
not be necessary for the continued survival of that society. 
However , to agree in this way is to ignore the fact that 
the values which a society holds are important to the 
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members of that society . Thus , to use Professor Hart's 
example , if the members of a society believe that homo-
sexuality causes earthquakes, and feel strongly that such 
behaviour should be prohibited by law , then it is the duty 
of the law- maker , acting for the preservation of society, 
to legislate according to this belief . It may also be 
the case that a society holds substantive values which 
because of their content are thought by the law-maker in 
that society, not to be condusive to the continued survival 
of that society . In th.is c:;;i se ii.t may be ar..g that · t- Hi 
ŸĚth.e law maker in th.at society, not to be 
con du si1te to the cont inuedsarvi~1--o:t:-.t.hat society. In 
this case it may be argued that it is the duty of the law-
maker to 'protect society against itself . ' However , it is 
submitted that in such a situation the law-maker should 
attempt to point out to the society why , in his opinion, 
the proposed law is inconsistent with the preservation of 
the society . If the members of the society accept that 
there is such an inconsistency and agree that their 
strongest wish is the preservation of society, then the 
law- maker may be said to be ' protecting society against 
itself ' only in the sense of ascertaining the deeper and 
more reflective wishes of society in which case he would 
still be legislating in accordance with the values in fact 
upheld by society and not against them . If however, the 
members of the society choose to ignore the warnings of 
the legislation whilst accepting his predictions as 
accurate , and still maintain that the substantive value in 
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question ought to be enforced then the problem is more 
difficult . The reason for this is that if the view that 
the law ' s proper function is to reflect the wishes of the 
society in which it operates is justified on the basis that 
each society has the right to ensure its continued survival 
and that legislating in accordance with such wishes is the 
way this should be done, then if the members of the society 
do not care about whether or not society survives the 
justification for the law functioning in accordance with 
the wishes of the members of the society is removed . Thus 
the thesis being advanced above cannot be applied to 
societies in which the members do not wish the society to 
survive. However, it is submitted tha t in as much as the 
thesis is advanced as a practical guide to legislation it 
will not be strongly criticised if it cannot accomodate such 
extreme examples as the one cited above. There is no way 
by which one could give the law the independent duty of 
preserving a given society in being - it can only derive 
its tasks and the ways it carries them out from the values 
held by the society in and for which it functions. 1 Another 
possibility is that the members of the society may refuse 
to accept that an inconsistency exists in which case it 
would seem that the duty of the law- maker is to enforce 
the belief whilst continuing to try and make the members 
realise the probable consequences in the hope that as the 
1. In other words, if the preservation of society is not 
regarded as being valuable in itself but only in as 
much as it serves to promote the interests of its members 
then if the members do not wish the society to contrive 
there can be no justification for the law- maker attempting 
to ensure its survival . 
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situation worsens (if it does , in fact , worsen) and it 
becomes evident that the survival of the society is threat -
ened , the people will see their earlier error and make a 
choice which removes the inconsistency . 
Should the law be used to lead public opinion? 
It is often argued that it is sometimes the 
duty of the ' enlightened ' legislator to lead public opinion ; 
to encourage the changing of the values held by the members 
of a society by the enforcement of laws which, whilst in 
opposition to present public opinion embody values which 
it would be ' better' or even 'morally right ' for the members 
to hold . Thus, in connection with the desegregation laws in 
the U. S.A . Professor Ginsberg argues that, 'It may well turn 
out that the desegregation laws, if persistently enforced, 
may help to bring about a change in attitud~ in behaviour , 
d t 11 . 1 . t . I 1 an even ua yin mora convic ions . Firstly , it must be 
noted that even Professor Ginsberg who advocates such laws, 
is uncertain as to the consequences of such legislation although 
he seems quite willing to take the risk of proceeding in such 
a way in opposition to public opinion . However , even if the 
consequences of such legislation could be predetermined in 
detail further problems remain . For example , it has already 
been argue d in the preceding chapte r that there are no 
' correct ' moral views ' in as much as a person can be said 
to give a wrong or incorrect answer to a question such as 
' Is racial segregation good? ' Even if the factual 
1 . Ginsberg , M. 1965 . On Justice in Society . Penguin Books . 
P . 235 . 
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consequences of such a policy are agreed upon there is no 
reason for supposing that any two people must agree that 
those consequences are either ' good ' or 'bad '. Thus the 
argument must be that, for example, the consequences of 
the desegregation policy will be 'better' or 'morally 
superior'. But now the question must be asked as to who 
is to decide whether this is so. Obviously, it cannot be 
the members of the general public as they would have 
arranged their moral valued differently - one's ground for 
holding a moral principle is in most cases based ultimately 
on an evaluation of the consequences of behaving in accord 
with that principle - in which case there would be no need 
to lead public opinion at all . So it would seem that the 
argument is simply that for a person who considers the 
consequences of a policy of segregation to be 'bad', 
the consequences of a policy of desegregation are ' better ' 
which is hardly surprising. 
Those who would assert that in some cases the law-
maker has a duty to lead public opinion usually argue that 
what gives the law-maker the right to attempt to lead 
public opinion in some cases is that after a certain period 
of time the general public will realise that the moral views 
they once held were 'incorrect' or, if it is conceded that 
the concept of 'correctness ' is not applicable to moral 
views, that they were not in the best interests of mankind 
or the members of society in which those views were held . 
However , the problem here is that these same people will 
wish to deny that the law-maker has this right when the 
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legislation with which he intends to change public opinion 
seems likely to have consequences which they cons ider not to 
be in the best interests of mankind etc . But once this is 
realised it must also be seen that as far as the law is 
concerned either~ has the right to le~d public opinion 
or tt does not . Suppose , for example , that in a particu-
lar society the members act in accordance vith a certain 
custom which they believe is valuable in itself and so 
ought to be continued although they also admit that acting 
in acco r d with this custom does cause a limited amount of 
pain to each of them . It may be argued by a certain group 
of people outside the society that because there does not 
appear to them t o be any rational justification for the 
infliction of pain in this case it is the duty of an 
' enlightened' law-maker to prohibit the practice and thereby 
attempt to change public op inion . Let it be assumed that 
the law- maker legislates accordingly and within a short 
period of time the members of the society are in agreement 
that the custom was not valuable at all and that they are 
better off without it . However , some time later another 
allegedly ' enlightened ' law- maker takes office and is 
persuaded that in fact the original custom was valuable 
and that it should never have been prohibited at all . The 
new law- maker legislates accordingly and he too is successful 
in changing public opinion with the result that the members 
of the society once more regard the custome as valuable . 
This possible example shows the difficulty which tho s e, who 
would assert that the law- maker h a s , under certain circum-
stances, the right to change public opinion, face; namely, 
that each person will only wish to give the law maker this 
right when his own moral principles conflict with those 
held by the members of the society. 1 In the example cited 
above, for instance, those who woul d wish to give the law-
maker this right in the first instance would wish to deny 
the existence of such a right in the latter instance, whilst 
those who would wish to give the law-maker the right to 
change public opinion in the latter instance would wish 
to deny it in the former instance. The problem is, however, 
that the law-maker can never determine, in any particular 
instance, whether he does have t h i s right for the answer to 
his question will depend solely on which person he asks. It 
may be argued that in a society in which the law-makers 
were voted into office the people will decide, in each case, 
whether the law-makers were justified in attempting to change 
public opinion by either re-electing them or voting them out 
of office. However , to argue in this way is to confuse two 
distinct issues. The mere fact that the law-makers are re-
elected may indeed show that they have succeeded in charging 
public opinion2 but it cannot show that they were justified 
in attempting to do so. 
The arguments presented above should not be construed 
as attempting to deny the quite different point that the 
enforcement of any law may, and in most cases will, have 
some effect on public opinion. It would indeed seem 
1. This may explain why those who would give the law-maker 
this right refer to 'leading public opinion' rather than 
to 'changing public opinion, thus implying that the 
proposed change will be for the better. 
2. If the subsequent election is fought on an issue concerning 
the enacted legislation then the re-election of the law-
maker's woµld seem to be grounds for believing that the 
law-makers succeeded in changing public opinion. However, 
likely that in a society in which the rule of law is 
regarded as being valuable and in the best interests of 
the members as a whole there may be a strong belief in 
' the majesty of the law' in which case the law as an 
institution may be regarded to some extent as the arbiter 
of morals. 1hatever may be the theoretical reason it seems 
to be a plain matter of fact that many people ' s moral 
attitudes are commonly influenced by the law . However , 
t h is in itself does not commit one to the view that it 
can ever be the duty of the law- maker to specifically set 
out proposed legislation with the aim of changing moral 
views according to his own moral views . Lord Devlin seems 
to recognise this point when he observes that obviously 
the legislator '··· will assume that the morals of his 
society are good and true; if he does not he should not 
be playing an active part in government . But he does not 
vouch for their goodness and truth , his mandate is to 
preserve the essentials of his society not to reconstruct 
them according to his own ideas~ 
To argue thus is not to deny that the individual 
whose moral views differ from those held by the rest of 
the community has no right to attempt to bring about a 
1 • 
it may be the case that the subsequent election is fought 
fresh issues in which case re - election o f the law- makers 
may be unc onnected with the particular l egislation in 
guestion . 
Devlin . op . cit . P . 90 . Lord De vlin ' s use of ' true ' is 
misleadins i f the arguments of this chapter are Jound . 
However , if that term is removed from the quotation, 
the tenor of Lord Devlin's view is unaltered . It is 
interesting to note that Professor Hart refers to 
' the innocuous conservative principle that there is a 
presumption that common and long- established institutions 
are likely to hav e merits not apparent to the rationalist 
philosopher .• Law , Liberty and Morality . op . cit . P . 29 . 
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change in the law but rather, to assert that his proper 
cou:a""se of action in such a case is to attempt to change the 
commonly held vi e ws. Thus it would seem that a member of a 
democratic society, for example, may consistently believe 
that a particular view held by the majority is not in the 
society's best interests (or in the best interests of 
mankind as a whole) and yet still believe that the majority 
view should prevail. In such a case his proper course of 
action, it is submitted, is to attempt to change the 
commonly held view by pointing to its probable consequences 
and thus appealing to factual misconceptions on which the 
majority view may be based. 
Finally it would seem that if, as has been argued 
in the preceding chapter, the laws concern with morality 
is with its cohesive force then the quality of the common 
belief is irrelevant. If the people of a society believe 
strongly that certain conduct is evil and ought to be 
prohibited by law, then the law-maker, whilst he may 
attempt to show the people that their view is based, for 
instance, on factual misconceptions, must, if the people 
do not accept his arguments, act in accordance with their 
view. 
Critical morality and positive morality 
On the views advanced above the answers to questions 
of the form, 'Ought the law ••• ?, should be arr ived at 
by reference to the answers to questions of the form 
'Does the society wi sh ·its law to ••• ?' Thus when 
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considering whether or not the criminal law of England ought 
to punish homosexual behaviour the relevant question to ask 
. 
is whetaer the members of English society wish the law to 
punish homosexual behaviour . To argue in this way is not 
to rule out of order any criticism based on the principles 
of a certain morality but rather to assert that they are 
properly addressed to the society which holds the values 
being criticised and not when directed at the law for 
reflecting those values. In other words, the positive 
morality of a society may be attacked by appeal to the 
principles of a critical morality but the latter cannot be 
used to criticise a law which reflects that positive morality. 
For example , a certain value held by the members of a 
particular society may be criticised from a utilitarian 
position as not tending to promote the greatest possible 
happiness . However, if it is a fact that such a value is 
held by the members of the particular society then the law 
as an institution cannot be criticised if it is in accor d 
wit.h that value. 
Thus the law may be criticised on the grounds that 
it is out of step with , or lags behind the values at 
present held by the members of the society in which it 
functions. 1 Similarly a law which attempts to support 
a value held by the society may be criticised for attempting 
to do so in a way in which the members do not believe that 
1. Lord Devlin refers to the 'shifts in the limits of 
tolerance' and on the arguments advanced in this chapter 
a law- maker who refused to act in accordance with such 
' shifts' could justifiably be criticised as could his 
laws . 
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it should . For example, the members of a society may 
believe that homosexuality is evil and ought to be dis-
couraged and yet not bel:ieve that it should be prohibited 
by law . They may hold that such a law would , in practice, 
be unenforceable and so bring the law as a whole into 
disrepute or that social ostracism is more effective 
in curb i ng such conduct. Again a system of law may be 
set up by a native tyrant who rules over an unwilling 
populace by sheer force or , used by a sub-group of 
society to further its own ends without regard to the 
wishes of the people at all . On each of these grounds 
the law may justifiably be criticised . 
The problem of ascertaining the values held in a 
pluralist society 
In a strongly monolithic society the problem of 
ascertaining the values which constitute the positive 
morality will not be acute . However, it may plausibly 
be argued that in a truly pluralist society it may prove 
very difficult for the law- maker to determine what 
values society does , in fact, hold - by definition 
different groups within it hold a variety of conflicting 
values . Does this mean that for the law to reflect the 
positive morality is not possible in such a society? If 
so , this would mean that the thesis here being advanced 
will not be applicable to most contemporary societies and this 
would constitute very strong criticism indeed of a thesis 
which is designed as a practj cal guide to legislation . 
However , the answer would seem to be simply that even in 
such a pluralist society it will still be for the members 
of that society to determine how , and within what limits , 
the law is to function . 
If for example , a third of the population believe 
that homosexual behaviour ought to be prohibited by the 
law and two thirds believe that it should not then i t is 
up to the members of that s o ciety to decide how such a 
dispute is to be settled . For example , the members may 
believe that my disagreement over substantive values 
(i . e . values concerning the content of the law) should be 
settled by general discussion and compromise (a procedural 
value) . If this is the case then the problem may be solved 
relatively easily; ~erhaps those who wish the law to prohibit 
homosexual behaviour would be satisfied with a law designed 
to protect minors and prohibit homosexual prostitution, 
whilst those who wish the law to permit homosexual behaviour 
may be satisfied if the law allows such conduct to be 
carried out in private between consenting adults . However , 
it may be the case that there is a dispute about how sub-
stantive disputes are to be settled; one side may hold , for 
example , that whilst all political and economic isvues, etc . 
should be settled in accordance with the views of the 
majority , the law ' s concern with the society ' s sexual 
moral code should be decided by a team of ' experts ', whereas 
the other side may believe that in so far as the law is 
concerned with the society ' s sexual moral code it should 
reflect , as clearly as possible , the majority public opinion. 
This dispute (a procedural one) will in turn have to be 
decided in the way in which society ' s members believe such 
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1 disputes should be settled . For instance , the members 
of the society may agree that such procedural issues should 
be settled by a referendum in which casero matter which 
side ' wins ' the law-maker will be able to legislate in 
accordance with the values (procedural) held by the mem-
bers (although reflecting only a proportion of the member ' s 
substantive va lues) and so , it is submitted , will be able 
to legislate in accordance with the ' values ' held by 
members of the society . If it is thought that following 
such a procedure to the law will not, ' in reality ' be 
reflecting the values held by the members of the society 
then it may be illuminating to consider whether, for example, 
a member of a democratic society can, with out being inconsis-
tent, believe both that a certain opinion held by the 
majority is inappropriate and also that the wishes of the 
majority should prevail . If, as has earlier been submitted, 
the two beliefs are indeed consistent then there would seem 
to be no objection to saying that a law which is set up in 
accord with the procedural values of the members of a 
society is reflecting the wishes of the members of the 
society even though some of the members may be in disagree-
ment with the substantive content of the law . 
1 . It woula seem that as the dispute widens t o involve more 
deeply held values the chances of society finding a 
method of settlement which is acceptable to all will 
increase (as the minimum agreements on which the society 
is based 7 is approached) although failure to find such a 
method will , at the same time , pose a greater threat to the 
continued survival of the society as one society . Further-
more , it should not be dismissed that each side to the 
procedural dispute will be composed of the same members 
of the society as compose d each side in the substantive 
dispute . A member of the group which composed two thirds 
of the population in the original substantive dispute 
will not necessarily , nor even probably, believe that 
the will of the majority should prevail in moral matters . 
Conclusion 
The aim of the arguments presented in this chapter 
has been to show that the law as an institution operating 
within a society cannot be discussed, nor its limits 
defined , ·,ithout references to the values held by the 
members of the society in and for which it functions . If 
the arguments presented are valid then it follows that 
any attempt to define ex ante theoretical limits to the 
proper scope of the criminal law must fail . The law in 
any society exists as an instrument to support the values 
held by the members of that society in the way the members 
wish them to be supported; its shape can be moulded, and 
its limits defined, only with reference to those values. 
The law of any particular society should express the values 
held by the members of that society; it should constitute 
a formal statement of those values. 
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